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Public Injunctions as a Way Around
Concepcion: California's Continued
Resistance to the Federal
Arbitration Act
Kilgore v. KeyBank, NA., 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kilgore v. KeyBank, National Association, known as Kilgore I, students al-
leged that KeyBank conspired with a bankrupt aviation school, which they attend-
ed, in order to profit from their loans.' The students sought a public injunction in
order to prevent the KeyBank from collecting on their loans or reporting default to
credit agencies.2 In March 2012, the Ninth Circuit decided that California's rule
prohibiting the arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief did not survive the
Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion and, therefore, was preempted by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).' The Ninth Circuit held that California's rule was
no longer viable.4
On December 11, 2012, less than one year after the court issued the Kilgore I
opinion, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc, known as Kilgore II. The
court declined to reach the question of whether, after Concepcion, the FAA
preempted California's rule against arbitrating claims for public injunctive relief.6
The court did not find the plaintiffs' claims to fall within the rule and did not need
to reach that broader question.'
This note outlines the general applicability of the FAA and preemption. Next,
it examines the Supreme Court's precedent concerning preemption, as it relates to
class actions and public policy. This note argues that California's public injunc-
tion exception does prohibit outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim
and is, thus, preempted by the FAA. The Supreme Court will likely see this rule as
being at odds with the FAA and as another repudiation from the California courts
of their long-standing FAA jurisprudence. Finally, this note argues that, despite
the likely preemption of California's rule, there are strong policy arguments
against arbitrating claims for public injunctive relief and that these claims should
be exempted from the FAA.
1. Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat'1 Ass'n, 673 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Kilgore 1].
2. Id. at 953.
3. Id. at 951.
4. Id. at 947.
5. Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat'1 Ass'n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Kilgore ll].
6. Id. at 1060.
7. Id.
1
Kiesewetter: Public Injunctions as a Way around Concepcion: California's Conti
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Matthew Kilgore and William Fuller filed a class action lawsuit against Key-
Bank, N.A., Key Education Resources, and Great Lakes Education Loan Services,
Inc. (collectively, "KeyBank"). Both Kilgore and Fuller ("Plaintiffs") attended a
private helicopter school in Oakland, California, which was run by Silver State
Helicopters, LLC (SSH). 9 SSH's preferred lender was KeyBank.10 The school
gave students loan application forms and general information about educational
loans from KeyBank." In order to fund their education, Plaintiffs and class mem-
bers borrowed between $50,000 and $60,000 from KeyBank.12
Plaintiffs alleged that the school was a sham and preyed upon low-income in-
dividuals who would have to take out student loans from SSH's preferred lender,
KeyBank." Plaintiffs and the members of the class signed a promissory note with
KeyBank, which contained an arbitration clause.14 It explicitly stated in signing
the note, Plaintiffs waived their rights to litigate claims against KeyBank and to
participate in class actions.15 Additionally, Plaintiffs waived their rights to class
arbitration, or to join or consolidate claims with other parties.1 6 The promissory
note contained an opt-out provision, which allowed Plaintiffs to opt-out of the
arbitration clause." The provision required the Plaintiffs to notify KeyBank of
their decision to opt-out, within 60 days of signing the note. 8
Both plaintiffs signed the notes, despite explicit, boldface language warning
them that (1) they would not have the opportunity to litigate,1 9 (2) emphasized the
importance of reading the whole contract,20 and (3) stressed that the contract
should not be signed until the signer had read it.21 The Service Contract Agree-
ment required all training to be complete within 18 months.22 Plaintiffs were not
able to fulfill all of their graduation requirements, required by the agreement, be-
cause the school closed and filed for bankruptcy in February of 2008.23
8. Id. at 1056; see Kilgore 1, 673 F.3d at 951.









18. Id. The Note also contained a choice of law and forum-selection clause. Id. The forum was
KeyBank's principle place of business, Ohio. The District Court found that California had a "material-
ly greater interest" than Ohio. Id. at 954. However, on appeal, KeyBank did not argue that the forum-
selection clause should have been enforced. Id. at 952.
19. Id. at 952. The language was boldface and stated, "I understand that the master student loan
promissory notes governing my loan contract contains an arbitration provision under which certain
disputes ... between me and you and/or certain other parties will be resolved by binding arbitration, if
elected by me or you or certain other parties. If a dispute is arbitrated, the parties will not have the
opportunity to have a judge or jury resolve it and other rights may be substantially limited." Id.
20. Id. Another statement in boldface warned, "Caution: It is important that I thoroughly read the
contract before I sign it." Id. at 952-53.
21. Id. at 953. "I will not sign this agreement/note before I read it (even if otherwise advised)." Id.
22. Id. In the Service Contract Agreement, SSH laid out the graduation and training requirements to
include 175 flight hours, classes, and individual lessons as needed. Id.
23. Id. SSH described its services as including 175 flight hours, which Plaintiffs did exceed. Id.
However, they did not get any kind of certification or diploma for their training. Id.
[Vol. 2014114
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On June 17, 2008, Plaintiffs filed suit against KeyBank in California state
court, alleging that KeyBank knew that the private student loan industry was in a
state of emergency, but kept loaning money to students anyway.24 After Plaintiffs
filed a second amended complaint, KeyBank removed the case to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California. 25 Plaintiffs alleged unfair competi-
tion and requested a pubic injunction to keep KeyBank from reporting the Plain-
tiffs' default to any credit agency, enforcing the notes against them, and from
26
entering into false and deceptive credit contracts. KeyBank moved to compel
arbitration, and the district court denied the motion. 27 The court held that Califor-
nia law, rather than Ohio law, controlled and that California's rule prohibiting the
28
arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief applied to the case.
The district court held that the California Supreme Court's rule prohibited the
arbitration of public injunctive relief claims, making the arbitration clause unen-
forceable. 2 9 KeyBank appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration and,
while that appeal was pending, moved to dismiss the third amended complaint.30
The district court granted the motion and the plaintiffs appealed. 1 The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in Kilgore I, vacated the district court's decision and stayed
arbitration pursuant to California law and the Federal Arbitration Act.3 2 In Kilgore
II, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs
claims and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration. The court held that
the claim brought by the plaintiffs was not a claim for public injunctive relief and,
as such, the California state law rule that prohibits arbitrating public injunctions
does not apply.3 4
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Application of the Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act mandates the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. The FAA provides that an agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."3 6 The Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration. The FAA is viewed as a congressional declaration
24. Id.
25. Id. Plaintiffs could not take action against SSH because of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362.
Id.
26. Id. at 953-54. Plaintiffs did not seek damages. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Ohio law, however, would have allowed arbitration of such claims. See also Hawkins v.
O'Brien, No. 22490, 2009 WL 50616 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009).
29. Id. This case was decided before the Supreme Court decided Concepcion and, as such, the
District Court was not able to apply it to this case. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 952.
33. Kilgore 11, 718 F.3d 1052 (2013).
34. Id.
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
36. Id. This is known as the FAA's "savings clause."
37. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
No. 1 ] 115
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of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, notwithstanding any state substan-
tive or procedural policies to the contrary." The Court has enunciated Congress'
intent in enacting the FAA as ensuring that parties are able to arbitrate quickly and
easily.3 9
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court decided the applicability of the FAA
to state court proceedings and gave a rationale for preemption.40 The California
Investment Law was applied to invalidate an arbitration agreement made pursuant
to the FAA. 41 The Court held that California's law conflicted with the FAA and
therefore violated the supremacy clause.42 The FAA "rests on the authority of
Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause... and was an
exercise of the Commerce Clause power [which] clearly implied that the substan-
tive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts." 43 While the
Court did recognize that the legislative history of the FAA was not without ambi-
guities, it found indications that Congress intended that arbitration agreements to
be enforceable beyond the federal courts.44 "The problems Congress faced were
therefore twofold: the old common law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure
of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements." 45
Confining the scope to federal courts would, in the Court's opinion, frustrate Con-
gress' intent that the FAA to be a broad enactment.46 Therefore, the Southland
Court viewed the "involving commerce" requirement the FAA savings clause not
as a limitation on the power of the federal courts, but as a necessary qualification
on a statute intended to apply in both state and federal courts. 47
In his Southland dissent, Justice Stevens expressed his belief that the general
rule of section 2 was also subject to the "implementation of certain substantive
state policies that would be undermined by enforcing certain categories of arbitra-
tion clauses."48 Drawing upon basic federalist principles, he argued that it is rare
for a federal statute to completely and totally displace state authority.49 Addition-
ally, the legislative history of the FAA did not support the conclusion that Con-
gress meant to entirely displace state authority in this particular field. 0 Justice
Stevens argued that "the limited objective of the Federal Arbitration Act was to
abrogate the general common law rule against the specific enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements."5 ' He wanted the Court to recognize that, as the savings clause
38. Id. at 24.
39. Id. at 22.
40. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Id. at 10-12. See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Corp., 388 U.S. 395
(1967) (holding that the FAA fell under Congress' broad power to fashion rules under the Commerce
Clause).
44. Id. at 12.
45. Id. at 14.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 14-15. See also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
48. Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice Stevens concurred with




51. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 536, at 2-3 (1924)).
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indicates, "[t]he purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements
as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so."52
In Perry v. Thomas, the Supreme Court applied its Southland reasoning and
holding.53 The Court was presented with the question of whether the California
Labor Code (CLC), which provided that actions for the collection of wages may
be maintained, "without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbi-
trate, was preempted by the FAA."54 Again, the Court held that federal policy
caused the FAA savings clause to directly conflict with California's rule that liti-
gants had to have access to a judicial forum to resolve disputes under the CLC.
56Therefore, according to the Supremacy Clause, state statutes must give way.
Justice Stevens' dissent, echoing his opinion in Southland, emphasized the fact
that the Court had essentially rewritten the FAA, giving it preemptive scope be-
yond Congress' original intent. Stevens argued that, as a matter of public policy,
states should be able to preclude waiver of a judicial forum.58 Justice O'Connor
also dissented, disagreeing with the Court's holding that the savings clause re-
quired the arbitration of the appellee's wages, despite clear state policy to the
contrary.59 In Justice O'Connor's opinion, the California legislature clearly in-
tended to preclude waiver of access to a judicial forum for certain claims, reflect-
ing an important state policy entitled respect.60
In Hall St. Associates, LLC v. Mattel, the Court decided whether statutory
grounds for prompt vacatur and modification could be supplemented by contract.61
The arbitration agreement at issue authorized a district court to set aside an arbi-
trator's award if "the arbitrator's findings of facts [we]re not supported by sub-
stantial evidence" or "the arbitrator's conclusions of law [we]re erroneous." 62 The
Court examined sections 10 and 11 of the FAA, which provide "exclusive regimes
for the review [of arbitration awards] provided by statute."63 The Court reasoned
that these statutory regimes could not be expanded by the parties' own arbitration
agreement.t While the Court found the grounds for review in sections 10 and 11
of the FAA to be exclusive, the Court did not "purport to say that they exclude
more searching review based on authority outside the statute as well."65
In the seminal FAA case, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme
Court held that the FAA preempted a California judicial rule, known as the Dis-
cover Bank rule, under which class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts were
52. Id. (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)).
53. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
54. Id. at 483; Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 229 (West 1971).
55. Id. at 491.
56. Id. at 490-91.
57. Id. at 493. "Even though the Arbitration Act had been on the books for almost 50 years in 1973,
apparently neither the Court nor the litigants even considered the possibility that the Act had preempt-
ed state-created rights." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 495.
61. Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2007).
62. Id. at 579.
63. Id. at 590.
64. Id. at 581.
65. Id. at 590.
No. 1 ] 117
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considered unconscionable. 66 The Court explained that "requiring class-wide arbi-
tration interfered with fundamental attributes of arbitration, creating a scheme
inconsistent with the FAA." 67 The Court also identified two situations in which
the FAA preempts a state law rule. First, "when state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular claim, the analysis is straightforward: the conflicting
rule is displaced by the FAA."68 Second, the FAA preempts a state law rules apply
generally applicable contract defenses, such as duress or unconscionability, in a
way that disfavors arbitration.69 Courts must ensure that state laws comply with
the objectives of the FAA; to ensure that arbitration agreements are enforced ac-
cording to their terms.70 Therefore, the Discover Bank rule was preempted because
"[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interfere[d] with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus create[d] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."n
The Court emphasized that the FAA does not hinge on a mechanical application
of the words, but rather on accomplishing the Act's objectives.7
It is clear that the Supreme Court, through its FAA jurisprudence, continues
to adhere to the view that there is a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.
Indeed, the Court has routinely ruled that the FAA preempts any conflicting state
laws.
B. Class Actions
As a matter of state public policy, California courts have attempted to invali-
date class action arbitration waivers. The courts reasoned that without access to
class procedures plaintiffs would be unable to afford to pursue their low-value
claims.
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int. Corp., AnimalFeeds brought a puta-
tive class action against Stolt-Nielsen asserting anti-trust claims regarding the
overly competitive prices charged by Stolt-Nielsen.7 4 AnimalFeeds demanded
class arbitration." The arbitrators concluded that the arbitration clause allowed for
class arbitration, even though the contract itself was silent as to the availability of
class procedures.7 6 The proceeding was stayed in order for the parties to seek judi-
cial review. Based on Supreme Court precedent and the contractual nature of
arbitration, the Court held that "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that
the party agreed to do so."7" The arbitrators' decision to impose class arbitration
was in conflict with the foundational principles of the FAA: that arbitration is a
66. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). See also Discover Bank v. Supe-
rior Ct. of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100 (2005).
67. Id. at 1748.
68. Id. at 1747.




73. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (2005).
74. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
75. Id. at 668.
76. Id. at 669.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 684.
[Vol. 2014118
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matter of consent.79 Unless specifically stated in an agreement, class arbitration
cannot be inferred because it dramatically changes the nature of arbitration.80
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court not only ruled on FAA
preemption of conflicting state laws, but also on the availability of class proce-
dures in arbitration.81 The rule at issue in Concepcion, known as the Discover
Bank rule, provided that a class arbitration waiver was unconscionable if it was
found in a consumer contract of adhesion. 82 It applied where the dispute between
the parties involved small amounts of damages and the party with superior bar-
gaining power had carried out a scheme to cheat large numbers of consumers out
of individually small sums of money.83 Although the Discover Bank rule did not
require class-wide arbitration, it allowed any party to a consumer contract to de-
mand it.84 The rule was limited to adhesion contracts, but as the majority pointed
out, "the times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are
long past."8' The Court explained that although the FAA savings clause preserves
generally applicable contract defenses, it "does not suggest an intent to preserve
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's ob-
jectives." 86 The Court found that allowing class-wide arbitration interfered with
fundamental attributes of arbitration, creating a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA.87
The Court provided three reasons why class arbitration is not preferable to bi-
lateral arbitration. First, class arbitration "sacrifices the principle advantage of
arbitration-its informality-and makes the process slower, more costly, and
more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment."89 Second, "class
arbitration requires procedural formality." 90 While parties could alter those proce-
dures by contract, there is no obvious alternative. 91 Therefore, "[i]f procedures are
too informal, absent class members would not be bound by the arbitration."92
Third, class arbitration increases the risks to defendants because "informal proce-
dures ... have a cost: the absence of multilayered review makes it more likely that
errors will go uncorrected." 93 The defendants were "willing to accept the costs of
these errors in arbitration, since their impact is limited to the size of individual
disputes, and presumably outweighed by savings from avoiding the courts."94
"Faced with even a small chance of devastating loss, defendants will be pressured
into settling questionable claims." 95
79. Id.
80. Id. at 68 5.
81. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
82. Id. at 1746 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76 (2005)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1750.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1743.
87. Id. at 1748.
88. Id.




93. Id. at 1752.
94. Id.
95. Id.
No. 1 ] 119
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The Supreme Court found Stolt-Nielsen instructive in analyzing the Concep-
cion case. 96 In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that an arbitration panel exceeded its
power under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. 97 The panel imposed class procedures
based on policy judgments rather than the arbitration agreement itself or some
background principle of contract law that would affect its interpretation.98 The
Court explained that the agreement "could not be interpreted to allow [class pro-
cedures] because the 'changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration
to class-action arbitration' are 'fundamental."' 99 Although it would be possible for
an arbitrator to have extensive knowledge of class action, arbitrators are not typi-
cally trained in the "often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the
protection of absent parties."100 Thus, the Court found arbitration poorly suited to
the higher stakes of class litigation. 01
C. Public Policy and Public Injunctions
During the FAA's first sixty years, public policy was cited as a defense to ar-
bitration. 102 The Supreme Court found it problematic that arbitration involved lay
judges, streamlined procedural rules, limited appellate rights, and provided no
means to enforce arbitral awards. 103 The Court found arbitration insufficient to
protect the people from "unconstitutional action under color of state law." 104
However, the Court shifted its view in the Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. decision. In Mitsubishi, the Court held that an agreement
to arbitrate a statutory claim did not waive a party's substantive statutory rights.105
According to the Court, the only difference between arbitration and adjudication
was that instead of a judicial forum, the issue was submitted to an arbitral fo-
rum.106 The Court reasoned that "if Congress intended the substantive protection
afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a
judicial forum, that intention would be deducible from text or legislative histo-
,,107
ry. ,0
In Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, West Virginia's state court re-
fused to enforce an arbitration clause in personal-injury or wrongful-death claim
against a nursing home, as a matter of law.10 The state court reasoned that Con-
gress did not intend for the FAA to apply to such claims, especially where the
96. Id.
97. Id. See also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1976).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1750.
100. Id. at 1750.
101. Id. at 1751.
102. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984). The FAA's House Report
stated that "its purpose was to place an arbitration agreement 'upon the same footing as other contracts,
where it belongs' and to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce" arbitration agree-
ments. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)).
104. Id. at 290.
105. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012).
[Vol. 2014120
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agreement involved a service that is a necessity for members of the public.1 09 The
Supreme Court found West Virginia's public policy argument unpersuasive and
contrary to the Court's precedent, as the FAA provides "no exception for person-
injury or wrongful-death claims." 110 Rather, the FAA requires courts to enforce
parties' agreement to arbitrate.1
Despite the Supreme Court's consistent rulings that the FAA preempts con-
flicting state laws, some state courts have attempted to carve out a small exception
under the savings clause, refusing to enforce arbitration agreements deemed to
violate state public policy. California is one such state. In Broughton v. Cigna
Healthplans of California and Cruz v. PacifICare Health Systems, Inc., the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court refused to require arbitration of public injunction claims.112
The court reasoned that arbitrators are poorly suited to order and ensure of the
ongoing relief sought by such claims." In Broughton, the court relied on the Su-
preme Court's acknowledgment in Mitsubishi that "not all controversies implicat-
ing statutory rights are suitable for arbitration."114 The California court interpreted
the Supreme Court's Mitsubishi decision to mean that "when the primary purpose
and effect of a statutory remedy is not to compensate for an individual wrong but
to prohibit and enjoin conduct injurious to the general public ... such a remedy
may be inherently incompatible with arbitration."1
The court outlined two factors that, when considered together, create an "in-
herent conflict" between arbitration and the purpose of the state's injunctive relief
remedy. First, that the relief sought benefits the public, rather than the private
party bringing the action. Second, a judicial forum has significantly greater insti-
tutional advantages over arbitration "in administering a public injunctive remedy,
which . . . will likely lead to the diminution or frustration of the public benefit if
the remedy is entrusted to arbitrators."11 6 The court held that "it would be perverse
to extend the policy [favoring arbitration] so far as to preclude states from passing
legislation the purposes of which make it incompatible with arbitration", or to
force states to arbitrate substantive rights afforded by their own legislation."' The
Ninth Circuit also agreed with the Broughton-Cruz rule that there are certain pub-
lic injunctions that are incompatible with arbitration and that these actions cannot
be subject to arbitration, even under a valid arbitration clause." 8
In Kilgore I, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the decision
of whether the Broughton-Cruz rule survived Concepcion.1 1 9 The court read the
Supreme Court's decisions on FAA preemption to mean that the only way to keep
109. Id. at 1203.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California, 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999); Cruz v. PacifiCare
Health Systems, Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (2003).
113. Id.
114. Broughton, 988 P.2d at 73 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id. at 74. "[T]he benefits of granting injunctive relief by and large do not accrue to that party,
but to the general public in danger of being victimized by the same deceptive practices as the plaintiff
suffered." Id. at 76.
116. Id. at 78.
117. Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (2003).
118. Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007).
119. Kilgore I, 673 F.3d 947 (2012). See also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011).
No. 1 ] 121
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a statutory claim out of arbitration was "if Congress intended to keep that federal
claim out of arbitration proceedings."120 The Broughton-Cruz rule prohibiting
arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was in direct conflict with the
FAA.12 The court held that the FAA preempted California's law because the
court could not "ignore Concepcion 's holding that state public policy cannot
trump the FAA when that policy prohibits the arbitration of a particular type of
claim." 122
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, styled "Kilgore II," the Ninth Circuit reconsidered its
Kilgore I decision en banc. In Kilgore II, the court again found that the agreement
to arbitrate was not unconscionable because the contractual provision was neither
procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. 123 The court recognized that Con-
cepcion made the plaintiffs argument, that a ban on class arbitration is substan-
tively unconscionable, moot. 124 Plaintiffs claimed that students would not be able
to afford arbitration fees, therefore the arbitration agreement was unconsciona-
ble. 125 The court held that the risk that plaintiffs would not be able to afford arbi-
tration was speculative and not enough to justify an invalidation of an arbitration
agreement. 126 The arbitration provision at issue in Kilgore was also not procedur-
ally unconscionable because students could reject the provision within sixty days
of signing the promissory note. 127 Additionally, the provision was not hidden or
buried within the contract. 12 Rather, the arbitration provision was found in a sepa-
rate section of the agreement, in capital letters and bold type.129
In Kilgore I, KeyBank argued that Concepcion vitiated the Broughton-Cruz
rule that prohibited arbitration for claims of public injunctive relief.130 However,
in Kilgore II, the court declined to accept KeyBank's broad reading of Concep-
cion because the Kilgore plaintiffs' claim was not one for public injunctive re-
lief.13 In the present case, the requested injunctive relief would have only benefit-
ed the 120 putative class members, not the larger public, and therefore, was not
governed by the Broughton-Cruz rule.13 2 Furthermore, KeyBank had completely
withdrawn from the private school lending business and there was no allegation
that they were continuing this practice, rendering it a past harm.3 Therefore,
there would be no "real prospective benefit to the public at large from the relief
120. Id. at 962.
121. Id. at 963.
122. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
123. Kilgore , 718 F.3d 1052 (2013).
124. Id. at 1058. See also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
125. Id.
126. Id. See also Green Tree Fin. Corp. Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000).
127. Id. at 1059.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Kilgore 1, 673 F.3d 947, 958 (2012) (citing Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 98 P.2d 67
(Cal. 1999)).
131. Kilgore II, 718 F.3d at 1060.
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sought." 13 4 Because the court declined to reach the question of Broughton- Cruz's
viability, it is unclear whether or not the rule survived post-Concepcion.
V. COMMENT
Utilizing its discretionary power to rehear Kilgore I, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals left the narrow Broughton-Cruz exception to the FAA intact. Despite
the Supreme Court's rejection of a "public interest" argument in Mitsubishi and
McMahon, the Ninth Circuit has circumvented the Court's arbitration jurispru-
dence classifying it as "essentially private [in] nature"- the public benefits were
merely incidental to the pursuit of a private remedy.135
The Broughton-Cruz rule is a public policy exception to the FAA. The rule
seeks to allow states to enact public policy exceptions to the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements. The FAA savings clause provides that arbitration agreements
are to be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon grounds that exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 136 However, in Southland the Su-
preme Court held that federal law preempts state law.137 In Concepcion, the Court
found that the objectives of the FAA broadly preempted conflicting state laws.
Then, in Hall Street, the Court limited exceptions to the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements under the FAA to federal statutory grounds. 13 9 If the Supreme
Court's FAA jurisprudence is considered as a whole and establishes authoritative
precedent, states may not establish public policy exceptions to the FAA. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kilgore II, avoided this quandary by addressing
the eligibility of the class for public injunctive relief instead of deciding the viabil-
ity of their public injunctive relief exception to the FAA.
While the Broughton-Cruz rule appeals to parties eager to avoid coercive ar-
bitration agreements, it is unlikely to survive review by the Supreme Court.140 The
Concepcion Court clarified the scope in the FAA savings clause by emphasizing
that the FAA will preempt a state public policy or doctrine, normally thought to
apply to the defense of contract claims, when it is applied in a fashion that disfa-
vors arbitration. 141 While California courts have argued that the Broughton-Cruz
rule does not prohibit outright the arbitration of public injunctive relief claims, it
has the effect of doing so. Even though the exception is narrow because it has only
applied to public injunctive relief claims under the California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, the Business and Professions Code, and the Labor Code, the rule
technically prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim- claims
for broad public injunctive relief. As the dissent in Broughton enunciated, the
Supreme Court's precedents concerning the preemptive effect of the FAA on state
laws are broad and do not permit any exception.142
134. Id.
135. Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 75 (Cal. 1999). See also Mitsubishi Mo-
tors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
136. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
137. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984).
138. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011).
139. Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2007).
140. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
141. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
142. Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California, 988 P.2d 67, 84 (Cal. 1999) (Chin, J., dissenting).
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Concepcion also rejected the proposition that invalidating arbitration agree-
ments using public policy rationales, like the one set forth in Broughton-Cruz, is
allowed under the FAA. 143 The Court held that states cannot require a legal proce-
dure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if the procedure or policy is "desira-
ble for other reasons." 144 Furthermore, the dissent in Broughton correctly pointed
out that Justin Stevens' dissent in Southland, which called for voiding a contract
as contrary to public policy, was rejected by the majority. 145 While Justice Stevens
argued that the state's rule that statutory claims were "void as a matter of public
policy" was entitled to respect, his argument ultimately failed.146 The state's rule
at issue would have allowed states to legislate around Congress's goal of placing
arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts.147 Because the ma-
jority expressly rejected Justice Stevens' public policy argument, it is likely that
the current court would do the same if directly presented with this issue.
In Conception, the Supreme Court noted California courts' hostility towards
arbitration, 14 as manifested by its many "devices and formulas" for finding arbi-
tration contrary to public policy. 149 The Court also noted that California courts
have found contracts to arbitrate unconscionable more than other contracts.150
Since Concepcion was decided California federal district courts have been
working to discern whether the Broughton-Cruz rule survived, but they have come
to different conclusions. The United States District Court of the Northern District
of California has determined that the rule was preempted by the FAA and did not
survive.151 The United States Court of the Central District of California found
otherwise, concluding that Broughton-Cruz is still viable after Concepcion.152 The
Central District court reasoned that the rule is not inconsistent with Concepcion
because it protects "important public rights and remedies."15' The court explained
that the Broughton-Cruz rule did not prohibit arbitration of a particular type of
claim outright because "it did not prohibit arbitration of all injunctive relief
claims, but only those brought on behalf of the general public."154
143. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
144. Id.
145. Broughton, 988 P.2d at 85 (Chin, J., dissenting). See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Southland, 465 U.S. at 20.
147. Id.
148. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
149. Id. (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959)).
150. Id. (citing Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doc-
trine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS Bus.
L.J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 185, 186-187 (2004)).
151. Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 10-05663-WHA, 2011 WL 1842712 (N.D. Cal. 2011). See
also In re Gateway LX6810 Computer Prods. Litig., No. SACV 10-1563-JST (JEMx), 2011 WL
3099862 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) (holding that claims for injunctive relief must be resolved in arbitra-
tion pursuant to the dispute resolution provision of the warranty at issue); In re Apple & AT & T iPad
Unlimited Data Plan Litig., No. C10-2553 RMW, 2011 WL 2886407 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (fol-
lowing Arellano); Zarandi v. Alliance Data Sys. Corp., No. CV 10-8309 DSF (JCGx), 2011 WL
1827228 (C.D. Cal May 9, 2011) (rejecting Plaintiff's request to bifurcate the claims seeking injunc-
tive relief because the FAA preempts state law to the extent it prohibits arbitration of a particular type
of claim).
152. In re DirecTV Early Cancellation Fee Marketing and Sales Practices Litig., 810 F.Supp.2d 1060
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
153. Id. at 1073.
154. Id. at 1072.
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The conflict between arbitration and public injunctive relief claims identified
by the Broughton court was a tension between the FAA and a California law.155
Federal law preemption requires that state laws give way to conflicting federal
laws. Under the Supremacy Clause, the FAA is the supreme law of the land. 15 6
Absent federal authority to the contrary, it is likely that the Supreme Court will
not see public injunctions or public interest claims as an exception within the FAA
savings clause. As the Broughton and Cruz decisions noted, there are many com-
pelling reasons that make arbitration unsuitable or the improper venue for vindi-
cating such broad public rights, but none of these reasons will survive federal
preemption after Concepcion.
Typically resistant to the FAA, the Ninth Circuit acted on important public
policy considerations in creating its Broughton-Cruz rule. While the Supreme
Court is not likely to uphold California's public policy exception, there is much at
stake if the FAA preempts the exception for public-injunction unconscionability.
Public injunctions are inherently different from other defenses available to con-
tracting parties. The purpose of arbitration is to resolve private disputes in a fast,
efficient, and simplified manner.1 5' However, the purpose of a public injunction is
to remedy a public wrong, not resolve a private dispute.1 58 Public injunctions rem-
edy wrongs committed against the general public. 159 Individual plaintiffs may not
act as a private attorney general if forced to individually arbitrate claims for public
injunctive relief.160
The purpose of public injunctions is directly at odds with the purpose of arbi-
tration, not because state legislatures or courts are resisting arbitration, but be-
cause arbitration is poorly suited to remedy public wrongs. For example, the Con-
sumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), the law at issue in Broughton, was intended
to "protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices."1 61 This
purpose was achieved by providing consumers with efficient and economic proce-
dures through which they could ensure such protection.1 62 The CLRA protected
consumers from the deceptive business practices of falsely advertising goods or
services, or making false representations about the status and quality of prod-
ucts. 163 A plaintiff bringing a CLRA claim, if forced to arbitrate, would force upon
the consumer the duty to protect the general public by acting as a private attorney
general attempting to enjoin future deceptive practices on behalf of the general
public. The purpose of the public injunctive relief under the CLRA is not to re-
solve a public dispute, but to remedy a public wrong. Arbitrating these types of
claims places the public in danger of falling prey to the same practices and allows
the perpetrator to get away with it without being held accountable. Arbitration
does not hold the offending party accountable to the public like a state's attorney
general can by bringing a lawsuit.
The Broughton-Cruz rule relied on the institutional shortcomings of arbitra-
tion in enforcing a public injunction. Indeed, arbitrators in California are not able
155. Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California, 988 P.2d 67 (1999).
156. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
157. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
158. Broughton, 988 P.2d at 88.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 74.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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to correct or modify any arbitration awards 30 days after entry of the award.' If
plaintiffs want to modify or change an arbitral award, they must initiate an entirely
new arbitration proceeding.1 65 This process is not ideal for seeking public injunc-
tive relief. Courts faced with claims for public injunctive relief are able to monitor
their injunctions on an ongoing basis and are able to reassess the public interest
and private rights as circumstances change.1 66 Furthermore, under California law,
even though the injunction would be public in scope, only the parties to the in-
junction would be able to enforce it.167 Even if the behavior was harming the pub-
lic, no one but the parties involved could move to enforce the judgment. The judg-
es who monitor these public injunctions are held accountable to the public in ways
that arbitrators are not. As such, judges and courts are the most appropriate forum
for protecting the public.
Echoing the dissents in both Southland and Perry, the court in Broughton
found nothing in the FAA legislative history indicating that the "universe of arbi-
tration agreements [that the FAA] was attempting to enforce" extended to arbitra-
tion of claims for public injunctive relief. 168 The dissenting opinions in both
Southland and Perry interpreted Congress's intent in enacting the FAA as making
agreements to arbitrate as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.1 69 The
dissent thought that important state policies deserve respect.170 There are rights
that cannot be suitably enforced through arbitration, whether they are state or
federal rights. Kilgore II was an attempt by the Ninth Circuit to avoid the Supreme
Court's ruling in Concepcion. Their concerns were apparent even in Kilgore I
when the Court acknowledged that enforcing arbitration agreements for public
injunctive relief claims "will reduce the effectiveness of state laws like the UCL.
It may be that the FAA preemption in this case will run contrary to a state's deci-
sion that arbitration is not conducive to broad injunctive relief claims as the judi-
cial forum."17 1 By rehearing Kilgore, the Court was able to get around Concepcion
and keep its state public policy rule alive, proving that the court was not "blind to
the concerns engendered" by their holding. 172 Arbitration is inappropriate for a
narrow category of actions, like those for public injunctive relief, because the
arbitration of these claims would deny the public the substantive rights afforded to
it by statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
Utilizing its discretionary power to rehear Kilgore I, en banc, the Ninth Cir-
cuit signaled to other circuits and courts that this issue is important, worth consid-
ering, and potentially viable post-Concepcion. While the rule against arbitrating
public injunctive claims may be desirable and has strong public policy support,
the Supreme Court's precedent and broad FAA preemption articulated in Concep-
164. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1284 (West 1982).
165. Broughton, 988 P.2d at 82.
166. Id. at 77.
167. Id. See also Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229 (1999).
168. Id.; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984).
169. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
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cion indicates that the Supreme Court will not accept the Ninth Circuit's argu-
ment. Unless the Court overrules Southland or contrary federal legislation is en-
acted, the FAA will preempt California's Broughton-Cruz rule. As it stands, the
savings clause has been made ineffectual. The Court has overturned every state
law or public policy that might be considered "grounds that exist at law or in equi-
ty for the revocation of any contract." While arbitration is not the appropriate
forum to remedy public harms, the Court will likely continue to assume that par-
ties do not give up their substantive rights in arbitration and that it is a suitable
forum for public injunctive relief claims.
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